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1.

Introduction
The passage of the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, frequently referred to as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), eliminated most of the remaining barriers erected between commercial banks and nonbank financial companies by the National Banking Act of 1864, by the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, and the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956.
Although Congress had debated the deregulation of the financial industry ten times in the previous two decades, prior legislative attempts to remove barriers between banks, investment companies, and insurance companies always failed to pass (Gaetano (1998) ). Despite repeated Congressional failure to produce sweeping legislation to redefine the financial industry, many of the barriers preventing banks from entering into the sale of insurance and securities were removed long before the GLBA's passage in 1999 through decisions made by regulatory bodies such as the Federal Reserve Board (FRB), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) (for further discussion, see Broome and Markham (2000) ).
Even without legislative reform, it was obvious that the financial industry would continue to consolidate and the distinction between traditional banking activities and nonbank financial companies would continue to gradually erode. However, the enthusiastic capital market response to the high-profile 1998 merger between Citicorp and Travelers Insurance Group to form Citigroup intensified the pressure on Congress to pass legislation to supersede the patchwork of rules and regulations that defined the financial industry. Given that banks could already engage in a host of nonbank financial services, perhaps the greatest significance of the Citicorp -Travelers merger was that it directly challenged regulators to address the manner in which banks and nonbank financial companies could enter into business combinations to form financial conglomerates. Recent studies by Carow (2001a) and by Johnston and Madura (2000) document that large banks, insurance companies, and brokerage houses experienced significant positive abnormal returns at the merger announcement. Both studies attribute this spillover of favorable returns as evidence that the merger would force Congress to deliver the long-overdue legislation to fully deregulate the financial industry, rather than simply debate the issue again, and then table it for another year. A little over a year after the 1998 formation of Citigroup, Congress passed the GLBA, which was signed by President Clinton on November 12, 1999. This study investigates how the passage of the GLBA affected the stock prices of banks, thrifts, finance companies, investment banks, and insurance companies (hereafter, collectively referred to as Financial Companies). Everyone knew that Congress would consider bills to reform the financial industry in 1999. The capital market reactions studied here document the extent to which the GLBA's legislative progress resolved uncertainties about the specifics of financial reform and simultaneously updated expectations regarding the probability that a substantive bill would finally pass. Three areas of uncertainty existed. The first issue was under what rules financial companies would be allowed to form conglomerates. The second issue was whether and how regulatory jurisdiction over financial conglomerates would be allocated between different financial regulators. Finally, President Clinton had threatened to veto the bill unless it upheld his concerns about regulating discrimination in credit via the Community Reinvestment Act.
When passed, the GLBA expanded the mix of permissible financial activities that could be carried out by a single company and removed many important restrictions on combinations between financial companies. In rearranging competitive opportunities in the financial industry, the GLBA allowed some financial companies to gain at the expense of others. In analyzing its effects by industry sector, we seek to identify cases where downward price pressures from increased competition offset or overcome upward price pressures from improved opportunities to form profitable financial conglomerates.
Overall, we find that individual financial sectors reacted diversely to the passage of the GLBA. The stock prices of investment banks and insurance companies increased significantly, but the stock prices of banks were not materially affected. At the other end of the spectrum, foreign banks, thrifts, and finance companies lost value. Further analysis indicates that larger investment banks and insurance companies reacted more favorably to the GLBA than did their smaller counterparts. These results are consistent with either of two mutually reinforcing hypotheses: (1) that large banks would target large nonbank financial companies for acquisition in search of scope economies, and (2) as Macey (2001) suggests, the GLBA was passed to serve the interests of large financial conglomerates, including especially investment banks who were interested in commercial banking. Benefits to large conglomerates might include an implicit extension of "too-big-to-fail" guarantees to the nonbank activities of future financial conglomerates and opportunities for financial conglomerates to amass significant market power (see Kane, 2000) .
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the regulation that defined the boundaries between bank and nonbank activities prior to the passage of the GLBA and then discusses some of the GLBA's highlights. Section 3 summarizes related literature and develops a foundation for our empirical tests. Section 4 details the key dates associated with the GLBA's passage, describes our sample, and discusses our methodology.
Section 5 presents our results and then Section 6 concludes.
2.
The Regulatory Environment
Overview of the historical separation of banking and nonbanking activities
Most statutory barriers between commercial banks and nonbank financial companies are contained in three pieces of legislation. Section 24 of the National Banking Act of 1864 permitted banks to exercise "all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking." Traditionally insurance was not considered incidental to banking, so banks were prohibited from engaging in the business of insurance. 1 In the wake of bank failures and the stock market crash of 1929, the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 sought to restore confidence in the financial industry. This Act's Section 20 prohibited a commercial bank from affiliating with any entity that is "engaged principally" in the sale of securities. Banks responded by using holding company affiliates to circumvent both sets of restrictions. As a nonbank corporate entity, a holding company could in principle own a bank, an investment bank, and an insurance company. To narrow this loophole, the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 restricted corporate affiliates to activities that are "closely related to banking." Although banks subsequently lobbied to expand their set of permissible activities beyond the "traditional banking activities" of taking deposits and making loans, actual expansions into new areas were not the result of targeted legislative change. Instead, as we discuss below, financial institutions entered into business combinations and/or otherwise pressured regulators to gradually dismantle the barriers between traditional bank and nonbank activities.
In recent years, the Federal Reserve allowed bank holding companies to underwrite and deal in securities as long as the holding company was not "engaged principally" in the securities underwriting business. These loophole affiliates are commonly called section 20 subsidiaries.
1 There are a few exceptions. For example, Section 92 of the National Banking Act of 1916 authorized national banks to sell insurance from banks located in towns with populations less than 5,000.
Immediately prior to the passage of the GLBA, the revenue from section 20 subsidiaries could not exceed 25% of the subsidiary's gross revenue.
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Similarly, on the insurance front, the Comptroller of the Currency took several steps to enable banks to enter into insurance markets. As an example, in 1985 the Comptroller declared annuities, traditionally a leading product of insurance companies, to be a general investment product rather than an insurance product for regulatory purposes. In a similar vein, in 1986, the
Comptroller expanded the loophole that permitted banks to sell insurance products in towns with populations under 5000 by interpreting the provision to authorize national banks to sell insurance anywhere, as long as their insurance transactions were conducted by a subsidiary bank or branch office in a town whose population did not exceed 5000. Although challenged by the insurance industry, these rulings were upheld by the Supreme Court. Hence, years before the passage of the GLBA, banking organizations were acting as agents in the sale of insurance policies underwritten by unaffiliated insurance companies and competing directly with insurance companies in writing annuities.
The easiest manner for companies to engage in both depository and nondepository activities prior to the GLBA was to use the platform of a nonbank unitary thrift holding company. With relatively few restrictions, nonbank holding company parents that owned a single thrift were allowed to carry out commercial and financial activities so long as they were not "detrimental to the safety and soundness of the thrift" (OTS (1997) to intervene in the activities of security firms and insurance companies will result in fewer regulatory conflicts and a smaller regulatory burden for financial companies that must comply with multiple operating standards. The GLBA closed the unitary-thrift loophole for nonfinancial firms. This provision applies to any financial company that is affiliated with a nonfinancial firm. Although this action reconfirmed the principle of separating banking and commerce, the law compromises the principle in a different way, through granting financial holding companies merchant banking powers.
Related Literature
Academicians have long debated the merits of separating bank and nonbank financial activities. Two areas receive the majority of attention in the literature. First, it is clear that banks may benefit from diversification if nonbank financial services reduce their dependency on loans as a dominant source of income (Saunders and Walters (1994) , Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon (1999), Szego (1986) , and Rose (1989) ). Second, nonbank services may permit banks to utilize their extensive branch networks, back offices, and client relationships more efficiently (Felgren (1985) , Szego (1986) , and Herring and Santomero (1990) ). Given that most middle-3 The Act does not prevent the Federal Reserve from establishing a consolidated capital requirement.
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and high-income consumers have relationships with a bank, banks may have an information advantage in assessing and accessing client resources (Herring and Santomero (1990) , Ang and Richardson (1994) , Kroszner and Rajan (1994) , and Puri (1994 Puri ( , 1996 ). This advantage could make it easier to market and service investment banking and insurance products, to adapt product design to customer needs, and to price the quality of an issuer in the underwriting process (Kroszner and Rajan (1994) and Puri, (1996 Puri, ( , 1999 ).
Empirical studies that examine earlier barrier-reducing events can provide a foundation for predicting how the stock prices and the risk-taking by bank and nonbank financial companies might change in response to the GLBA's passage. One such event was BankAmerica's acquisition of Charles Schwab in 1981. This deal resulted in the entry of banks into the discount brokerage arena. Saunders and Smirlock (1987) report that while bank prices and risk were largely unaffected, small securities firms experienced a significant decrease in value, presumably in response to the threat of increased future competition from banks. However, these authors found no evidence to suggest an increase in the systematic risk exposure of money-center or regional banks during the announcement period or in response to the deal's ultimate approval by the Federal Reserve.
Carow ( However, subsequent authorizations to underwrite corporate securities and to increase the percentage of permissible revenues from underwriting activities produced negative abnormal returns along with increased risk. Consistent with increased competition for investment banking services, they find some evidence that the stock prices of investment banks decreased around the announcements. As further documentation of competitive pressures, the evidence provided by Puri (1996) , Gande et al. (1997) , and Gande, Puri, and Saunders (1999) suggests that underwriting spreads and bond yield spreads are lowered when banks compete in underwriting activities.
Johnston and Madura (2000) and Carow (2001a) examine how the announcement of the Citicorp-Travelers merger affected the stock prices of financial companies. Johnston and Madura (2000) report that insurance companies, brokerage firms, and large and medium sized banks all experienced statistically significant positive stock price reactions to the announcement.
Large banks and large brokerage firms experienced the largest returns. They interpret the positive stock price movements as predicting that regulators would be forced to allow future combinations of financial companies. Based on the size effect, they suggest that larger institutions are more likely to be involved in future business combinations, possibly because of greater efficiencies to be realized from larger distribution networks. Carow (2001a) does not find a statistically significant stock price reaction for commercial banks as a whole -though he finds evidence of a positive size effect for banks. Abnormal returns for banks with assets greater than $10 billion prove significantly higher than the abnormal returns of smaller banks. Carow segregates the insurance companies in his sample and shows that the stock prices of life insurance companies increased by 1.02% in response to the merger announcement, whereas the returns for health and property/casualty insurers were insignificant. Carow attributes the gains to anticipated synergies resulting from future combinations of large banks and life insurance companies and/or a potential expansion of the government safety net to include the nonbank activities of financial conglomerates.
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Except for the Citicorp-Travelers merger, the events analyzed focus on intrusions by banks into the product markets of nonbank financial companies. These intrusions were asymmetric in that banks gained additional powers, while the nonbank financial companies involved suffered increased competition. These asymmetric intrusions generate patterns of stock price responses in which nonbank financial companies lose value and the stock prices of banks tend on average either to be unaffected or to increase slightly. This stream of research supports Kane's (1984) argument that the progressive fusion of the financial industry in the face of barrier-reducing technological advance illustrates Baumol's (1982) theory of contestable markets.
The Citicorp-Travelers merger was a symptom of the ever-increasing competition in the financial industry and signaled that a fairer and possibly more efficient way to create a financial powerhouse was to combine large banks and large nonbank financial companies, rather than to exploit the loopholes and exceptions that favored asymmetric bank entry into nonbank activities.
The qualitatively similar stock price reactions to prior occurrences of industry segments "fusing" together provides a foundation for predicting that stock price reactions to the GLBA would balance offsetting forces. On the one hand and consistent with contestable-markets theory, all firms in the industry should experience downward price pressure due to increased future competition. On the other hand, individual firms whose characteristics positioned them to jettison regulatory circumvention costs associated with loophole exploitation and to use the relaxation of the remaining barriers to effect business combinations with first-mover advantages should experience upward price pressure. The literature just reviewed suggests that large financial companies may be able to develop economies of scope or scale associated with using their extensive distribution channels and volumes of client information. Large firms may benefit further if consolidation results in increased market power or an implicit expansion of the government safety net (due too-big-to-fail considerations) to nonbank financial activities (Kane, 2000) . At the same time, sectors of the financial industry where firms are likely to become future takeover targets as a result of the deregulation should benefit from the relaxed restrictions for business combinations.
Legislative dates, sample selection, and methodology
Legislative dates leading up to the passage of the GLBA
Our tests of GLBA's effects focus on the stock price movements of financial companies in response to key legislative events leading up to the bill's passage. Because Congressional committees had debated and approved similar deregulatory legislation ten times in the past twenty years, we limit the analysis to legislative events that represent progress beyond Congressional committee approvals. 5 The six legislative events we analyze are listed in Table 1 and include: (1) have daily returns available on CRSP from 9/98 through 11/99, 3.
be traded on at least 70% of the possible trading days, and 4.
have balance sheet and income statement data available on Compustat. proportion of firms with section 20 subsidiaries, the average market value of assets for the firms, and the proportion of firms with greater than $10 billion in assets.
Methods
We measure the effect of the designated legislative events by means of a multivariate regression model. The approach closely resembles the methods employed by Schipper and Thompson (1985) , Cornett and Tehranian (1989) , Billingsley and Lamy (1992) , Sundaram, Rangan, and Davidson (1992) and Carow and Heron (1998) in prior studies of the wealth effects of regulatory processes. The model incorporates the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR)
any of the conclusions drawn in this study.
framework where dummy variables assume values of one on the key legislative dates and are zero otherwise. 7 As compared to the traditional event-study techniques such as introduced by Fama et al. (1969) and described in Brown and Warner (1985) , SUR takes into account crosssectional correlations among the stock returns of the various firms examined.
Formally, we estimate the following system of n equations over a period beginning
September 1, 1998 and ending November 15 th , 1999. We do this separately for domestic banks, foreign banks, thrifts, finance companies, investment banks, and insurance companies. R it = the observed return on firm i's stock on day t, R mt = the observed return on the equal-weighted CRSP market index on day t, ∆I t = the change in the rate on day t for a 10-year constant-maturity Treasury (I t -I t-1 ), D j = an indicator variable equal to 1 on the jth legislative event, and 0 otherwise, n = the number of firms, and e it = the residual error term.
Our regression model incorporates changes in interest rates (similar to Booth and Officer (1985) ) as well as overall market returns. In this regard, b i measures market risk and c i captures firm i's interest rate risk.
6 Each of these events was covered by the Wall Street Journal. 7 We use two-day legislative event windows in the SUR estimation. The two-day windows include the days listed in Table 1 as well as the following trading day. Thus, we use a total of (6 x 2) = 12 dummy variables in the SUR. In this context, our estimate of the overall market reaction to the legislation represents the sum of the coefficients on the 12 dummy variables. 8 We analyze US and foreign banks separately throughout the analysis. We find similar results if we analyze the different types of insurance companies (life, health, and property / casualty) separately. We combine the three types into a single category of "insurance companies" because there are relatively few publicly held life and health insurance companies.
The weighted least squares approach used to estimate the parameters assumes that disturbances are independently and identically distributed within each equation, but allows variances to differ across equations. In this SUR framework, heteroscedasticity and contemporaneously correlated disturbances are incorporated into the hypotheses tested. Turning now to nondepository firms, the 32 finance companies in the sample show a negative effect. They experienced an average abnormal return of -5.72% and only 25% had positive CARs. As with foreign banks, the roughly 6% decline is not quite statistically significant at conventional levels, but the signs test indicates that the proportion of positive abnormal returns is significantly below 50%.
Empirical Results
Stock price reactions to the passage of the GLBA
Unlike finance companies, investment banks and insurance companies gained value during the legislative process. On average, investment banks had CARs of 4.05% and 66.67% of them showed positive returns (significantly different from 50% at the 10% level). Insurance companies gained even more from the GLBA's passage. Their average abnormal return is 5.15% and 68.24% had positive abnormal returns (both significant at the 1% level). Overall, the SUR analysis shows that some sectors of the financial industry reacted in a positive manner to the passage of the GLBA, whereas some sectors declined in value. The final line in Table 3 shows the corresponding figures when all categories of financial companies (552 total firms) are aggregated into a single portfolio for the SUR estimation. The overall result is an average abnormal return of 0.17% when cumulated across all event dates and 0.94% on October 22 nd . We also test whether the cumulative abnormal returns over all announcements for all portfolios jointly equal zero or jointly equal each other. The values of the F-tests are 3.28 and 3.92, with p-values of .0033 and .0015, respectively. The joint hypothesis tests confirm that the returns are not jointly equal to zero and that significant cross-sectional variation exists in the sample. In the following section, we use a multivariate cross-sectional analysis to investigate additional factors that might have influenced subsample price reactions. We base our cross-sectional return analysis on Table 3 's first panel for at least two reasons. First, the probability of passage does not reach 100 percent until the bill is signed.
Cross-sectional tests
Second, at each stage of the legislative process, additions or deletions may be made that may result in material changes in each sector's stake in the bills going forward. Therefore, at each legislative event, there exists new information about both the features of the bill and the probability of its ultimate passage. The only way to capture the ebb and flow of information is to cumulate over all relevant legislative events, ending with the signing of the bill (see Appendix A for further discussion).
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Each cross-sectional regression model includes a dummy variable that identifies each category of financial companies (with the exception of small (< $10 billion) domestic banks, which are represented by the intercept). In this model, sectoral coefficients measure the extent to which the abnormal return for each sector differs from the abnormal return for small domestic banks without a unitary thrift or section 20 subsidiary. Categorical variables for company size represent the extent to which the abnormal returns for firms with greater than $10 billion in assets differ from the abnormal returns of firms in the same sector with assets less than $10 billion.
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(October 22 nd , 1999) returns. 11 Given the amount of news coverage surrounding October 22, we also tested whether the conclusions we draw from our cross-sectional tests also hold on this individual date. The primary conclusions of our study do not change if we use only the third event period. 12 Note that the coefficients and statistical significance of the indicator variables for each category of financial service companies in Table 4 are similar, but are not directly comparable to the univariate estimates in Table 3 because the multivariate analysis includes measures of size and other factors that may influence stock price The CAR regressions indicate that, when controlling for size, three categories of financial companies (foreign banks, thrifts, and finance companies) experienced significantly lower abnormal returns than did U.S. banks. Across both models, the coefficients on the foreign banks' indicator variable are significantly negative at the 1% level, ranging from -6.627% in model 2 to -8.292% in model 1. The most likely reason for the significantly lower stock price reaction for foreign banks than domestic banks has to do with the GLBA's capitalization requirements for conducting business as a financial holding company in the United States. For a foreign bank to be eligible for financial holding company status in the U.S., it must be considered "well-capitalized" by U.S. standards. In determining capitalization status, U.S.
regulators must assess the entire organization, including operations outside of the United States.
Because many foreign countries impose lower capital requirements than the U.S., this eligibility requirement imposes new costs on foreign institutions that want to do business in the United
States as a financial holding company.
Coefficients for the thrift sector are nearly the same in both models: -1.453% (model 1) and -1.765% (model 2), although the statistical significance varies. The significantly lower stock price reaction of thrifts relative to banks is to be expected given the GLBA's reduction of the thrift charter's advantages. Prior to the GLBA, the thrift charter not only provided a method of combining financial and nonfinancial enterprises through a unitary thrift holding company, but also provided a loophole mechanism for combining depository services, insurance, and brokerage. The GLBA closed the unitary thrift holding company loophole that permitted nonbanking companies (including insurance companies) to establish a single thrift subsidiary, and established the financial holding company structure as the primary structure for combining banks, insurance, and brokerage firms (for further discussion, see Broome and Markham (2000) ).
reactions, such as having a unitary thrift charter or a section 20 subsidiary.
The coefficients for the finance companies are also close: -6.055% and -7.054%. These values are statistically lower than the corresponding returns of U.S. banks at the 1% level. As did the univariate SUR results, this suggests that this sector was harmed by the GLBA's passage.
Again, this is a predicted reaction. The GLBA called for a greater separation between financial and nonfinancial companies and most large finance companies are affiliated with nonfinancial firms. GLBA simultaneously limits the ability of finance companies to expand into other financial activities and expands opportunities for other sectors to compete with them.
Two sectors experienced significantly more positive abnormal returns than U.S. banks.
Both models indicate that the returns to investment banks exceed those for banks by nearly 3% to 4%. Similar results occur for insurance companies. The gains experienced by investment banks and insurance companies are likely attributable to two, possibly reinforcing factors. The first is that the GLBA defeated efforts to charter a new umbrella financial regulatory body. The GLBA specifically limits the extent of the Federal Reserve's authority over entities that are functionally regulated by other regulators, and it strengthens the hand of the SEC and insurance regulators by assigning them equal deference in disagreements that end up in court. Without these limitations and assignments, nonbanks would experience an additional layer of regulation, and the ability of the SEC, insurance regulators, and bank regulators to promote sectoral interests would be curtailed. The second factor favoring these sectors is the market's presumption that many of their members are apt to be to be targeted by banks for acquisition in the post-GLBA period. 13 Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan (1999) extensively review the bank merger and acquisition literature and suggest that we may be entering a new wave of mergers and acquisitions that will encompass large banking organizations and financial service providers worldwide. Many studies 13 Most news commentary suggests that investment banks and insurance companies are less likely to acquire banks. For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of an insurance company acquiring a bank, see Broome and show that the majority of the gains from acquisitions accrue to the shareholders of target companies (e.g., Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter (1988) ). Such a result is reinforced by prior studies of the effects of deregulation in the banking industry. For example, Carow and Heron (1998) find evidence that likely takeover targets experienced significantly higher returns at the passage of the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994.
Coefficients benchmarking the unitary-thrift effects are not significant. The GLBA grandfathers these companies, so that they can continue to use this organizational form to offer a variety of financial products. We may infer that these companies fare better than other thrifts because the coefficient for all thrifts (of which 40 percent are chartered as unitary thrift holding companies) is significantly negative.
We also find no significant influence from the existence of a section 20 subsidiary. It appears that firms that were using section 20 subsidiaries to underwrite securities prior to the GLBA will not retain important first-mover advantages.
Both the financial press and past academic literature suggest that large financial institutions may gain more from deregulation than smaller firms (see for example, Houston and Ryngaert (1994) , Kane (2000) , Delong (2001) , and Houston, James, and Ryngaert (2001)). To test this hypothesis, we include binary measures that identify as large firms in each sector those whose assets exceed $10 billion. The size dummy in model 1 ignores the sectoral nature of large firms. The significantly positive coefficient of 3.779% confirms the conjecture that the largest gains from the deregulation are likely to accrue to large companies.
Model 2 further refines the analysis by specifying separate size dummies for all but one sectoral category (foreign banks). This allows us to investigate whether and how the size effect Markham (2000) . varies across financial subsectors. Although the coefficients on all sectoral size dummies are positive, their magnitude is not statistically significant for banks and thrifts. Given that large banks had repeatedly experienced larger stock price responses to pre-1999 signals of the impending deregulation of their financial powers, and in light of the concessions banks had to make to other institutions to elicit their support for the bill, the lack of a significant size effect in the stock returns of depository institutions is not unreasonable.
14 Stock markets had already capitalized the major gains associated with expanded banking powers and what is being evaluated here is the market's assessment of the horse-trading the industry engaged in to seal the deal. Regulatory decisions and court rulings had already enabled large banks to engage in most of the services being authorized by the GLBA. 15 As Kane (1996) points out after the passage of the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act in 1994, "History suggests that for the US financial-services industry, before an exclusionary statute comes to be formally rescinded, most of the effects targeted by the rescission will have already been tolerated by the enforcement system for years." Although many of the benefits of deregulation were already included in the stock prices of the affected firms, the legislation would eliminate some of the unnecessarily high costs of doing things in a circumventive fashion. Our results suggest that the value of these cost savings to domestic banks and thrifts approximately equaled the opportunity cost of increased competition from other industry sectors. It is important to note that despite the GLBA's benefits, many restrictions still exist. For example, the GLBA restricts banks in choosing between a 14 The GLBA also addresses some of the concerns of small depositories through the creation of Community Financial Institutions. Depositories with less than $500 million in assets can obtain advances for small business and agricultural loans by pledging these assets as collateral for Federal Home Loan Bank Advances. While an indicator variable for depository institutions with assets of less then $500 million has a positive coefficient, it is not significantly different from zero. Excluding this variable does not affect any of our conclusions. 15 See our earlier discussion in section 2 regarding how banks could sell insurance products and how large banks could underwrite securities long before the GLBA's passage. Gaetano (1998) argues that of the basic powers approved in GLBA, prior regulations had been relaxed to the point where banks were only restricted from controlling open-end mutual funds and underwriting insurance. Even the restrictions on underwriting insurance subsidiary or affiliate structure as well as its ability to share customer data with nonaffiliated firms.
The statistically significant positive coefficient on size for finance companies does not suggest that large finance companies benefited from the Act at the expense of smaller finance companies. Rather, the net effect for large finance companies is determined by adding three coefficients: the intercept, the coefficient on the finance companies indicator, and the coefficient on the finance companies size dummy. This sum equals -0.667% (0.034% -7.054% + 6.353%).
Along with the industry-wide estimate reported in Table 3 , we infer only that large finance companies were not harmed by the threat of increased competition to the same extent as small finance companies were.
In contrast, the significant positive coefficients on the size dummies for investment banks (8.308%) and insurance companies (7.871%) have the same sign as the sectoral indicators The size effect is also broadly consistent with Houston and Ryngaert (1994) , Kane (2000) , Delong (2001), and Houston, James, and Ryngaert (2001) , who find that in the banking industry, mergers between larger organizations and mergers that increase concentration and market power produce larger shareholder gains. Hoenig (1999) and Kane (2000) also argue that the gains to were being undermined. Five states allowed state chartered banks to underwrite insurance (Carow (2001b) ).
large investment banks and insurance companies may also reflect an implicit extension of "toobig-to-fail" guarantees. If FHC firewalls are not strong enough to prevent the "too-big-to-fail" guarantee from being shared with affiliates, an investment bank or insurance company that acquires or is acquired by a large bank can gain from these implicit guarantees through lower funding costs or an improved credit standing. Although financial companies and even commercial companies had a host of exceptions and loopholes that allowed them to cross-sell financial services prior to the GLBA, the patchwork of laws in place importantly restricted the creation of financial conglomerates. As the GLBA moved through the legislative process, it became increasingly likely the costs of effecting cross-sectoral combinations of financial firms would be greatly reduced. Capital markets may have bid up the stock prices of likely acquisition targets by predicting potential deals. Our results suggest that the largest returns to the GLBA's passage were realized by large investment banks and large insurance companies. The stock prices of banks, both small and large, were unaffected by the legislation. We interpret this result to mean that the concessions banks made to pass the legislation produced a deal that left them little average net incremental benefits. The 16 Kane and Yu (1994) and Kroszner and Strahan (1996) show how subsidies implicit in the government safety net may distort a financial institution's actions.
major benefits from product-line diversification at banks appear to have already been impounded into bank stock prices. Finally, thrifts, finance companies, and foreign banks lost value due to the passage of the GLBA. Table 1 and the following trading day. Thus, we incorporate a total of 12 (6 x 2) dummy variables in the SUR. Within this framework, for each firm, the estimation of the market's overall reaction to the legislation represents the sum of the coefficients on the 12 dummy variables. The reported cumulative abnormal return figures in this Table are the average across each category of firms. a The z-statistic is determined as,
, where G is the number of positive parameter estimates, N is the total number of parameter estimates, and P = .50 (the probability of a positive estimate). *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. a In each industry sector, a firm is defined as large if its assets > $10 billion.
Sum of abnormal returns across all legislative events: 1.2% + 0.9% +0.275% + 0.125% = 2.5%
Notice that 2.5% is exactly equal to what we knew in advance to be the collective effect if the legislation were to pass with 100% probability removing the separation between financial companies (1.50%) and not include provisions limiting the use of personal bank data (1.00%).
Although deliberately simplistic, this example captures our motivation for summing across all legislative dates in order to determine the overall wealth effects of the legislation. It also shows the potential problems with an analysis of individual dates. If one were to analyze our hypothetical event 3 separately, they could easily make the wrong conclusion. Given the prior information, we knew that eliminating the provision that allows banks to expand into commercial activities would result in a reduction in value; however, note that the stock price reaction on the 3 rd event is a positive 0.275%. Because both the features and the probability of passage are simultaneously changing in a dynamic legislative process, a summation across legislative events is necessary to correctly ascertain the underlying wealth effects.
In our study, it is clear that the most important date in the legislative process occurred when the Conference Committee agreed to a compromise version of the GLBA. This date enhanced the likelihood that the bill would ultimately pass (i.e., at this point the probability of the bill's passage became very high). We include the remaining dates to acknowledge the possibility of additional compromise and/or failure.
